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The Crisis of Cost Recovery and the Waste of 
the Industrialised Nations 
 
Karel Williams, Colin Haslam, John Williams, Sukhdev Johal, Andy 
Adcroft, Robert Willis 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper argues the case for shifting the problem of advanced country 
competitivity onto the terrain of social accounting. It introduces new concepts such as cost 
recovery and social settlement, before presenting a range of empirical evidence which 
demonstrates the nature and extent of the current Western crisis about cash generation. The 
argument and evidence has important implications for policy. Under present conditions, free 
trade between high and low wage countries is likely to increase disemployment and 
encourage a pathological mutation of corporate behaviour and social institutions in the 
advanced countries.  
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Crisis: “the point in the progress of a disease when an important development or change 
takes place; the turning point of a disease for better or worse; also applied to any marked or 
sudden variation occurring in the progress of a disease”  
(Oxford English Dictionary) 
 
 This paper is concerned with pathological crisis in the Oxford English Dictionary 
sense. The disease is disemployment in the advanced countries and this paper argues that the 
wasting disease will take an acute turn for the worse with the entrance of low wage 
countries into large scale international trade in manufactures. This development will 
aggravate chronic internal problems within the advanced economies and generally intensify 
the loss of manufacturing employment and pressure on pay and conditions in all the 
advanced countries. We also predict that it could undermine hitherto successful and 
exemplary advanced economies such as Germany and Japan. 
 
 The paper which develops these arguments is organised in a relatively 
straightforward way. A first framework section argues the case for a problem shift which 
relocates the problem of national competitivity in a social accounting framework which 
focuses attention on cash generation and cost recovery; it establishes the basic point that 
workers must always be sacked by enterprises which are unable to recover their costs and 
realise a surplus over and above labour conversion costs.  The next section briefly outlines 
the world we have lost and looks back at post war competition in the old order between 
established high wage industrial countries whose social settlements put a floor under 
competition.  The next three sections of the paper outline the current developments which, if 
taken together, justify the idea of crisis and a new disorder: the first of these developments is 
the external threat of ultra cash-generative low wage competition like the Koreans; the 
second internal development is the emergence of major sectors like cars and whole national 
economies like Germany where cash generation is problematic; the third and final 
development is the mutation of institutions and behaviour which, on Anglo-American 
evidence, accompanies the extraction of cash from declining industrial bases. A concluding 
section sets the evidence and argument into perspective and offers some interpretation as 
well as a discussion of implications. 
 
 The arguments in this paper have developed out of our work on the auto industry 
(Williams et al., 1994c). This paper moves on to consider a broader range of evidence on the 
electrical/electronics sector and manufacturing as a whole. If we aim to formulate broader 
generalisations on the basis of this evidence, the generalisations (as in our earlier work) still 
concern manufacturing rather than services and tradeable goods rather than the sheltered 
sectors. Manufacturing in this broad sense now accounts for a relatively small share of 
Gross Domestic Product or employment in the advanced countries; in employment terms, 
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for example, manufacturing accounts for only 18-32 percent of employment within the 
different Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries who 
generate most of their employment from sheltered services. But, this observation does not 
justify the conclusion that manufacturing does not matter. The manufacturing sector remains 
strategic in all the advanced economies because it directly generates high wage blue collar 
employment and indirectly generates the exports necessary to pay for imports and avoid 
trade constraint. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, the average wage is 25 percent 
higher in manufacturing than in services; and, in all the advanced countries, manufacturing 
accounts for 75 to 90 percent of exports with autos and electricals alone accounting for 35 
percent of world trade.  Furthermore, our social accounting framework and our argument 
about cash and cost recovery can be extended to sheltered services. From this point of view, 
services are simply about different pressures but the same outcome in terms of 
disemployment and deteriorating pay and conditions: the pressures arising from competition 
between high and low wage social settlements in tradeable goods are reinforced by 
competition within social settlements in sheltered services. Research on these destructive 
forms of internal competition, especially privatisation and deregulation, is the next priority 
on our agenda. 
 
A Social Accounting Framework of Analysis: Labour Costs and the Cash Surplus 
 
 The issues which concern us are usually constructed on the terrain of economics 
where the debate is whether problems about national competitivity justify deviations from 
free trade. Recent American economists' debates on competitivity clearly demonstrate this 
approach which arises from the strong assumption of orthodox economics in favour of free 
exchange as a basis for efficiency gains which increase consumer welfare. Producer welfare 
is frequently ignored on the implied grounds that displaced factors will be (relatively) 
smoothly re-employed elsewhere. We are proposing a problem shift which moves the 
argument onto the terrain of social accounting. 
 
 We need first to confront one aspect of recent discussions. It might seem that in their 
concern about American competitivity and their recognition of the ubiquity of oligopoly, 
strategic interaction and structural impediment, that some economists have repudiated the 
free trade stance. Closer examination shows that they are only concerned about limited 
special cases. Thus, Laura Tyson's most recent book argues the case for “cautious activism” 
in the special case of high technology trade because oligopoly and structural impediments 
are the norm in these sectors which “make  special contributions to the long term health of 
the American economy” (Tyson, 1992, p.12) in terms of productivity, technology 
development and high wage employment. But low and medium technology trade, which on 
Tyson's classification in 1988 accounted for 74 percent of American manufactured imports 
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(Tyson, 1992, p.28 see also Reich, 1993, p.312), is best left to free trade. In any event, 
Tyson style special case arguments are fiercely resisted by most economists. Foreign Affairs 
recently carried a provocative essay by Paul Krugman whose message was in its title, 
“competitiveness: a dangerous obsession”. 
 
 Those of us who work outside economics draw two conclusions from these debates. 
First, those who, like Tyson, argue a modest competitivity case on economic terrain will be 
violently attacked by those of more conservative persuasion whose policy prescriptions are 
those of the liberal market. Second, those who, like Krugman, attack competitivity have not 
demonstrated it is really an irrelevant problem and that free trade is a good thing: they have 
instead shown that the problem definition and the interventionist policy prescription cannot 
be sustained on the terrain of economics. Our response is simply to shift the argument onto 
the terrain of social accounting, the new discourse which we are creating by fusing an 
accounting concept of conversion cost recovery with new social categories such as “social 
settlement”. The accounting categories are conceptually important in themselves and 
because they open up new measurement possibilities when they match the categories of 
company financial reporting and official statistics. The concept of social settlement is 
important because it allows us to reject aspects of the a priori of economics: most of what 
we register positively as producer welfare and decent pay and conditions through the 
enforcement of social minima appears negatively in economics as a series of obstacles 
which stand in the way of labour market adjustment and job creation.  
 
 The first and most important point to explain is that social accounting focuses not on 
profit but on the cash surplus available to the enterprise, sector or national economy. The 
mission of the capitalist enterprise is to recover costs which includes the requirement to 
generate a cash surplus over and above labour conversion costs: the cash surplus covers the 
productive requirement of capital consumption (viz depreciation); reinvestment in new 
product and process; plus the financial requirements of interest payments and distributions 
to shareholders which meet the claims of the rentier. If cash generation fails, it becomes 
difficult to stay in the business in sectors like cars and electronics where the maintenance of 
market share depends on new models whose development absorbs large amounts of cash. 
The rentier's preoccupation with profit is understandable but unjustified from a broader 
social point of view because (retained and distributed) profit usually accounts for a 
relatively small proportion of the cash surplus which is available to the enterprise and from 
which other claims must be satisfied. For example, under a self denying ordinance, 
committed, long term rentiers may make modest financial claims for distributed profits; but 
this makes no difference at all if cash flow has failed and the requirements of productive 
renewal cannot be met. 
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 In enterprises, sectors and national economies, cash generation is always problematic 
because cash is the surplus over and above labour conversion costs and labour normally 
takes 70 per cent of the value added in manufacturing or service enterprises. Cash normally 
accounts for no more than 30 per cent of value added: free cash accounts for even less 
because depreciation is the first, fixed charge on the surplus. Labour's share of value added 
(the inverse of cash flow) typically fluctuates within a relatively narrow band +/- 10 per cent 
either side of 70 over the trade cycle. In whole sectors and national economies, labour's 
share will always be re-normalised around 70 per cent in the long run, although this is not 
true at the level of the enterprise in the short run. Re-normalisation is  relatively 
unproblematic if it is possible to pass on increased costs to the consumer; if that is 
impossible, the main burden of adjustment falls on the workforce. The ratio stays at a boring 
70 per cent but at the expense of interesting changes in the numbers employed within the 
enterprise, sector or national economy.  
 
 If cash generation fails and labour's share rides up above 70 per cent, the social 
consequences are likely to be considerable because firms, sectors and national economies 
which fail to generate cash can no longer balance the interests of the different stakeholders 
(workers, management and shareholders) who all make different claims on the value added 
fund. This conflict will usually be resolved by sacrificing the interest of the worker 
stakeholders whose wages and salaries make the first claim on value added. The different 
national forms of capitalism are all subject to one iron law; when cost recovery fails, the 
workers must be sacrificed because their wages are an expense which prevents managers 
from productively reinvesting in the business and shareholders from claiming the financial 
rights of property. Shareholders may temporarily pass up their rights to distributed profit, 
but that will only delay adjustment at the expense of the workforce in any business where 
management needs cash for productive renewal. If the social consequences of re-
normalisation at the expense of the workforce are considerable, it is important to understand 
the conditions under which labour's share rises above 70 per cent and the options available 
to enterprises, sectors and economies which must re-normalise labour's share. 
 
 Our analysis of the conditions of cost recovery puts considerable emphasis on the 
demand side: where others put the main emphasis on management agency from the supply 
side, we instead emphasise structural factors on the demand side. Thus, we differ 
fundamentally from orthodox economics whose discussion of firms and sectors focuses 
almost entirely on supply side influences through its sub discourse on productivity which 
attaches an exaggerated significance to what happens inside the factory of the capitalist 
enterprise: these supply side assumptions have been uncritically appropriated by the 
discourses of management which propose reorganisation of production and the labour 
process through hard and soft changes like Just in Time (JIT) for the machines and Human 
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Resource Management (HRM) for the workers. If the balance between management agency 
and structural factors is historically variable, we would emphasise that demand difficulties 
about market saturation and cyclicality are usually quite literally beyond management which 
can only downsize in the hope of finding a cash surplus. Conversely, when demand is brisk 
and plants are fully loaded, most firms can generate cash; in repetitive manufacturing, it is 
usually the last 20 per cent of capacity utilisation which generates the cash. At the cyclical 
and structural extremes of boom and bust, financial results inside the firm, sector and 
national economy reflect external market conditions much more than purposive 
management action. 
 
 There is, of course, some scope for management action to improve financial and 
physical results and our accounting schema is designed to identify the possibilities and 
options for improving cost recovery. The accounting desideratum is always the same: the  
firm or sector must generate a larger financial surplus over labour costs (which equal 
physical labour hours  wage cost per hour). The key question therefore is whether and how 
firms and sectors can manage cost reduction by taking physical hours and/or wage costs out 
of the product and do so in ways which generate a sustainable advantage because other 
firms and sectors cannot follow: fairly obviously, if everybody can manage cost reduction, 
individual firms and sectors are unlikely to improve their collective financial results because 
the benefits will usually be appropriated by consumers in the form of cheaper product. In 
considering the different options for cost reduction we would discriminate between direct 
and indirect productionist responses and financial engineering which all involve 
considerable social pain because cost reduction means variable combinations of head count 
reduction, intensification through “speed up”, rate busting and relocation to lower wage 
geographic areas or marginal social groups. It is a neglected truism that the areas in which 
there is scope for management action it can often embody these less endearing features. 
 
 Cost reduction through taking labour hours and cost out of the product in the factory 
would be unnecessary if cost recovery could be improved through repositioning the product 
in the market. This kind of repositioning depends on supply and demand side conditions 
which together determine the scope for non-price competition between differentiated 
products. On the supply side, producing firms must be able to add real or imaginary 
characteristics which justify a premium price as, for example, Mercedes Benz can but 
Compaq cannot. On the demand side, the composition of demand must be such as to 
generate the volume demand base which covers the tooling expense of repetitive 
manufacturing. Those who sell high ticket items in small national markets quickly discover 
that the market is a major constraint. 
 
 Builders of upmarket products can hope to recover long hours and high wages in the 
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market place so that they do not have to drive the workers in the factory. But this, of course, 
may be humane aspiration rather than sustainable achievement: as we argue later in this 
paper, the crisis of cost recovery is now most severe in firms and sectors (like German and 
Swedish motor vehicle manufacturers) which once prospered by selling up market product. 
The “flexible specialisation” (flec-spec) scenario, as sketched by Piore and Sabel, held out 
the hope of cost recovery solutions for most manufacturing sectors where “end of mass 
production” demand patterns would encourage producers generally to move the product up 
market and offer greater variety: their only question was about whether existing firms and 
regions could manage the transition to the new forms of economic organisation required in 
the new era. The flex-spec outcome would be nice but, like the perfect day, it is unlikely to 
happen (Williams et al., 1987). The overall balance between de-commodification and re-
commodification is uncertain because both principles operate in different product markets at 
the same time. Demand for variety may not improve cost recovery if it results in increased 
development and tooling costs. Furthermore, as we demonstrate later in this article, the 
evidence so far does not support the crucial assumption that in most sectors consumers will 
pay for different and up market products. 
 
 If cost reduction then becomes the name of the game, the direct productionist 
response of cost reducers is to take physical labour hours out of the product or to take 
financial cost out of the product by accessing lower wages; ceteris paribus, both options will 
lower costs and improve cost recovery. The balance between the two options depends on a 
variety of considerations which can be briefly analyzed. In repetitive manufacturing of cars, 
white goods and brown goods, it is usually possible to take labour hours out of the product 
either by redesigning processes in mechanical products or by redesigning the product (to 
incorporate more functions in one component) in electronics. If this is the response which 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) advocates of “lean production” (Womack 
et al., 1990) recommend, many managers are at least as interested in accessing lower wages; 
if you can't beat them on hours, why not join them in low wages by shifting production 
offshore?  
 
 
 The balance between physical intervention in production and financially motivated 
relocation of production depends on a number of considerations. The two key variables are 
the extent to which hours reduction generates a sustainable advantage and the financial 
leverage that is obtained through relocation. Hours reduction is sufficient only if the one 
firm or sector can achieve hours reduction which its competitors cannot; in any world where 
most of the sectoral players are converging on low build hours, hours reduction is a 
necessary condition of survival but not a sustainable source of advantage. Relocation of 
production generates additional leverage if relocation does not involve a build hours penalty 
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and if relocation accesses national social settlements where wages are substantially lower, 
hours are longer and the social mark up is lower. The assumption of this argument is that it 
is very difficult for the individual firm or sector to reduce wages and conditions within an 
existing economy where these are determined by external structural forces. 
 
 Social settlement is our concept of a national or regional/bloc set of structural 
variables which is semi-fixed because it is embedded in institutional structures and sets a 
national floor under competition. On the supply side, the settlement includes conventions 
about wages and hours worked, national systems for allocating social charges such as 
pension costs and patterns of segmentation with definite wage gradients between large 
assemblers and their usually smaller suppliers. On the demand side, the main variables are 
market space and pricing conventions which determine the level of capacity utilisation and 
the possibility of recovering the costs of underutilisation in cyclical conditions. 
 
 The central argument of this paper is that competition between social settlements 
where the structural variables have different values is seriously threatening for workers in 
high wage, relatively privileged settlements. Within any social settlement, new firms and 
sectors typically move along an arc like trajectory which ends in a descent into ordinariness 
as average firms reach the limits of the market. When build hours converge, competition 
between social settlements to supply tradeable goods to mass markets means that price 
matters and free trade leads to victory for the producers who operate in low cost social 
settlements which have structural advantages in terms of wages and hours so that they can 
generate more cash from any given price level. Enterprises which are disadvantaged by their 
social settlement will either run down production or transfer production elsewhere if the 
values of key variables within their native settlement  cannot be changed. From this point of 
view, the development of low wage Asian economies opens up new relocation possibilities 
and intensifies the external pressures for down sizing the workforce which arise from pre-
existing internal problems about cost recovery in all the advanced economies. These 
pressures will be intensified by the secondary response of financial engineering which 
displaces the efforts of management from the factory to the Bourses and banking parlours. 
 
The Old Order: Competition amongst the few with a Social Floor 
 
 Our framework on competitivity is not only conceptually different, it is also 
designed to be filled with empirical content: indeed, the next three sections of this paper are 
largely concerned with pouring empirical content into the empty conceptual boxes of the 
last section. By way of contrast, much of the orthodox literature on competitivity has a 
negligible empirical content. Consider, for example, Lester Thurrow's (1994) Head to Head, 
which makes the strong assumption that the “economic battle” of the next generation will be 
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between the three major trading blocs of this generation (Europe, America and Japan) and 
predicts that Europe will win. Thurrow does provide a variety of supporting arguments and 
illustrations to justify his triad assumption, but his book lacks systematic empirical content: 
its 336 pages include just seven statistical tables and illustrations. The more systematic 
evidence presented below suggests that Thurrow has confused the old and new economic 
orders: as we argue in this section, the old order was distinguished by limited competition 
amongst the established few, while the next section shows how the new disorder sees the 
entrance of extra players whose competition is destabilising. 
 
 Like other 1940s architects of the post war order, Keynes assumed that an expanded 
trade in manufactures would involve their supply by a few established players within a 
relatively unchanging international division of labour where Europe and North America had 
a virtual monopoly of manufactures which would be exchanged for raw materials and food 
stuffs from the rest of the world. In a famous passage of the 1930s, Keynes had observed 
that he was not a free trader if free trade meant the closure of the British steel or cars 
industry. But by the 1940s he was confident that it would not come to that because the 
competitive outcome of freer trade would be tolerable within a world of limited 
competition. Thus, the panic of the late 1940s and early 1950s was about how Europe could 
meet the challenge of low cost American production under free trade conditions: the result 
was reports by the OEEC (precursor of the OECD) and by the Anglo American Council on 
Productivity (AACP) which both argued that efficiency improvement through emulation of 
American practice could meet this challenge. 
 
 The developments of the next fifty years generally vindicated Keynes' optimism.  
The main development was the emergence of new forms of intra-regional competition 
within Europe; these developments especially affected the big four West European countries 
(France, Italy, UK and West Germany) which in the mid-1950s supplied something like 90 
per cent of their requirement for manufactures from factories within their national 
boundaries.  By the mid 1980s, these countries were importing 35 per cent or more of their 
manufactures, mainly from other European countries. The result was a gentle process of 
integration within the regional European Community (EC) bloc; as we have argued 
elsewhere (Cutler et al., 1989), Germany and Spain gained from this process, Britain lost 
and the rest stayed more or less where they were. Inter-regional competition between major 
blocs was much more limited.  The Atlantic threat of cheap American exports to Europe, 
which had exercised the OEEC and the AACP, never really materialised because the 
Americans preferred to meet European demands by branch manufacture within Europe. 
Significant inter-regional competition was inaugurated across the Pacific by the unexpected 
Japanese success against the Americans in the mid-1970s. This upset inaugurated serious 
inter-regional competition and trade friction because the main Japanese export market was 
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the US and American penetration of the Japanese market was blocked by protection and 
structural obstacles. 
 
 As a first generalisation, we can say that, from the 1940s to the 1980s, the 
competition between the few established producers of manufactures was limited because the 
established players had social settlements which were different but all involved some 
combination of high wages, short hours and a high mark up for social charges. The one 
successful new entrant of the 1960s and 1970s was Japan which started off looking very 
different but increasingly came to resemble the established industrial countries. In the 
1990s, Japan and all the other established players now face the challenge of new 
competitors with very different characteristics. 
 
Table 1: Manufacturing Industries Total Labour Costs per Employee in $ 
 
 France Germany Italy UK US Japan Korea 
1979 18,329 21,232 13,888 11,320 21,157 18,070 4,244 
1983 17,288 19,088 14,026 12,793 23,099 14,518 5,162 
1987 28,669 25,257 25,257 18,125 32,493 26,620 7,199 
1989 29,423 31,857 28,630 21,301 30,829 30,963 12,464 
Ave 
79-89 
23,427 24,358 20,450 15,884 26,894 22,542 7,267 
Source: Eurostat, Series 4C, Industrial Statistics Yearbook, United Nations; Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, International Labour Office, various years. 
 
 Table 1 illustrates this point by presenting basic data on total labour costs per 
employee in manufacturing industries in various advanced economies (including Japan); the 
Korean data provides a “new entrant” point of reference and comparison. In the average 
advanced country, labour costs per employee in manufacturing averaged $20,000 over the 
decade of the 1980s.  In Britain, which has become the low wage outlier, the average labour 
cost per employee was still nearly $16,000.  As table 1 also shows, industrialising Asian 
countries like Korea are at an entirely different level.  The Korean average cost is $7,250 per 
manufacturing employee over the decade of the 1980s and this average is biased upwards by 
the recent rise in Korean wages towards the end of the decade; in every year up to 1987, 
Korean labour costs were below $7,000 per employee. 
 
 If all the established producers of manufactures are high labour cost producers, it 
should also be observed that the group of established producers also includes significant 
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labour cost differences and movements: the established are not all and always the same. 
However, in the period up to the mid 1980s, most of these differences and movements were 
stabilising in that they cancelled or reduced national competitive advantage. If we begin by 
considering differences amongst the established, the US and Germany have historically had 
higher labour costs than other advanced countries; table 1, for example, shows that US 
labour costs are on average twice as high as in UK and that German labour costs are usually 
50 per cent higher than those in Britain. In both cases, the high wages were a way of 
distributing the benefits of cost reduction and cost recovery in a way which cancelled what 
would otherwise have been a massive advantage in terms of cash generation. The Germans 
are the European masters of cost recovery through the production of bourgeois products, 
epitomised by Mercedes Benz and BMW, while the Americans were long the champions of 
cost reduction who operated with a lower level of labour input per unit of output. As for the 
movements, the most striking is that of Japan where money and real wages have risen 
rapidly: Japan entered the scene as a low wage new entrant in the 1960s and 1970s but by 
the early 1980s Japanese labour costs per employee matched those of countries like Italy or 
Britain and by the end of the decade equalled those of Germany and the US. 
 
 Annual labour costs are high in all the advanced countries because (except in Japan) 
the cost effects of high hourly wage rates are reinforced by relatively short working hours 
and hefty mark ups to cover social charges; the social settlements of the advanced countries 
can be defined as variable combinations of these three invariant elements. The position on 
hours worked is illustrated by table 2 which presents data on hours worked in electrical 
engineering which are fairly representative of those worked in other manufacturing sectors 
within each national economy; in each case, hours worked in the other economies are 
compared with those worked in Germany which provides the base of 100 in each year. As 
table 2 shows, in three pace setting advanced countries (Germany, Italy and Sweden) hours 
worked are at or below 1,550 per year. They are higher in many other advanced industrial 
countries, but hours worked are seldom much over 2,000 hours per year in any of the long 
established industrial countries. By way of contrast, the Asian old and new entrants start 
where the Europeans stop. Japanese wages rose rapidly in the 1980s, but hours worked did 
not fall; in the boom years after 1984, the Japanese were working more than 2,200 hours per 
worker per year. The Koreans, who epitomise the next generation of new entrants, put in 
2,700 hours or more in every year up to 1989. Across a broad range of sectors, including 
autos as well as electricals and electronics, the Korean working year of 2,750 hours is 
almost exactly twice as long as the Swedish working year of 1,400 hours or less in the late 
1980s. 
 
Table 2: Index of Hours Worked in the Electrical Engineering Sector (Code 383) 
Germany=100 
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 Germany Sweden Italy France UK US Japan Korea 
1979 100 89 98 128 134 118 136 168 
1980 100 86 102 129 133 119 138 163 
1981 100 89 95 130 135 121 140 167 
1982 100 92 91 128 137 119 139 164 
1983 100 97 103 132 138 122 142 172 
1984 100 92 93 123 129 129 151 182 
1985 100 90 95 125 132 119 138 168 
1986 100 90 97 127 133 122 138 172 
1987 100 89 99 129 136 124 141 173 
1988 100 89 n/a 130 139 121 145 171 
1989 100 n/a n/a 131 142 128 143 167 
1990 100 n/a n/a 136 143 n/a 144 164 
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years, International Labour Office. 
 If the Swedes have to employ two workers to deliver the same number of hours as 
one Korean worker, that costs partly because it increases the bill for social charges. Table 3 
presents data on the mark up for social charges in the different advanced economies. We 
again use sectoral data to illustrate the pattern; the data in table 3 covers the auto sector 
which is again fairly representative of the position at least in the larger firms of the different 
economies.  These figures should carry a health warning because there are many ways of 
charging the costs of health, social security and retirement to taxpayers as well as to 
employers and employees; it is therefore difficult and dangerous to interpret them. But the 
statistics do show that employers bear a large charge in pace-setting industrial countries like 
Germany, Sweden and Italy where the social mark up more or less doubles the basic hourly 
rate. Even in countries like the US which has no tradition of universal minima, or Britain 
where employers do not pay much towards an increasingly exiguous minimum, social 
charges add some 35 per cent to the hourly wage rate. Again, the pattern is that Asian 
countries start where the Europeans stop; in the old entrant, Japan, the mark up is some 30 
per cent and in the new entrant, Korea, the mark up is no higher than 20 per cent. 
 
Table 3: Employer Social Mark up as a Percent of Basic Hourly Wage in the Motor 
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Manufacturing Sector 
 
 Germany Sweden Italy France UK US Japan Korea 
1979 66.5 64.0 119.0 75.0 35.0 39.0 25.0 n/a 
1980 68.6 65.0 112.0 79.0 36.0 39.0 28.0 n/a 
1981 70.5 66.0 104.0 79.0 39.0 39.0 27.0 n/a 
1982 71.0 65.0 106.0 79.0 39.0 39.0 28.0 n/a 
1983 71.0 68.0 107.0 79.0 38.0 41.0 29.0 5.0 
1984 74.0 75.0 107.0 84.0 37.0 39.0 29.0 29.0 
1985 73.0 75.0 113.0 85.0 36.0 42.0 30.0 21.0 
1986 74.0 76.0 114.0 87.0 36.0 50.0 30.0 17.0 
1987 73.0 76.0 113.0 90.0 36.0 45.0 30.0 19.0 
1988 73.0 76.0 114.0 88.0 37.0 39.0 30.0 16.0 
1989 73.0 78.0 115.0 82.0 37.0 38.0 30.0 19.0 
1990 72.0 77.0 117.0 82.0 37.0 37.0 30.0 23.0 
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour Office, Fax communication, 
Verband Der Autombilindustrie (VDA), various years. 
 
 From this review of the evidence on labour costs, hours worked and social mark up 
we draw three conclusions. First, the international differences between established industrial 
countries and new entrants involve more than large differences in hourly wages; annual 
labour cost parity with the Koreans would require a much longer working year and fewer 
social benefits for most workers in advanced countries. Second, over the past 50 years in the 
old order, industrial leadership was associated with high wages in the American case and 
also with short hours and high social mark up in the German case; if one does not believe in 
marginal productivity, there is no reason why this association should be maintained in the 
next period.  
 
 Finally, in the old order, the broad similarities in social settlement (plus 
compensating differences and movements) put a social floor under competition which was 
effectively confined to high wage countries plus one new entrant, Japan, which became a 
high wage country. This floor will be removed if a succession of low wage new entrants, 
like Korea, succeed in matching (or substantially closing the gap on) hours to build against 
Western high labour cost competitors. 
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The New Disorder: Element (a) The Emergence of Ultra Cash-Generative Low 
Wage Competition 
 
 Analysis of the new disorder eludes the measures which were generated by 
economics to explain an earlier situation. In constructing an index of international 
competitiveness, economics relies on Relative Unit Labour Cost (RULC) (nominal wages 
over real product): the focus is on price competition via relative movements in wages 
motored by differences in domestic inflation rates. This was relevant to the old order and the 
contest between established players, though even then it could never accommodate the 
Germans and the Swedes, who built their national economies on the principle of market 
place cost recovery not factory cost reduction. In the new disorder, where there are large 
differences in absolute wages between established players and new entrants, absolute wages 
and build hours are much more relevant. Social accounting constructs the results in terms of 
cash (nominal sales minus nominal wages) which generates the interesting observation that 
new entrants are powerful competitors because they are usually ultra cash generative. 
 
 The cash premium does not of course come from low wages per se but from the 
combination of low wages with internationally competitive build hours in the production of 
products whose price level is determined by the cost recovery requirements of high wage 
producers. And from this point of view, the crucial issue is the build hours requirement of 
established and new producers which is seldom brought into focus in academic social 
science: as we have pointed out elsewhere (Williams et al. 1992) the MIT comparisons of 
car assembly hours are unhlepful and misleading. But, in the case of the cars sector, the unit 
of output is such that it is possible to make simple calculations of sectoral hours to build a 
vehicle by dividing vehicles produced into hours available within each national sector which 
is in turn obtained by multiplying number of workers by a realistic estimate of hours 
worked. The results are interesting and alarming because in the cars industry at least, the 
evidence suggests that all the different national sectors, old and new, are converging on the 
same low build hours. The evidence summarised in table 4 shows that the Americans long 
ago found out how to build a vehicle in less than 200 hours; the Japanese closed the gap and 
passed them in the 1970s; the French and all the South European producers pulled the same 
trick in the 1980s and the Germans are now setting about doing something similar in the 
1990s. Significantly, the Koreans started off twenty years ago with a huge build hour 
requirement of more than 3,000 hours which they have been steadily reducing to a 
creditable 350 hours by the later 1980s and a fully competitive 200 hours by the early 
1990s. This makes the Koreans competitive because the scope for sustained further hours 
reduction is apparently limited by product and process characteristics; on the evidence of 
 
 
   The Crisis of Cost Recovery Page 15 
 
America and Japan, 150 hours +/- 20 appears to be the irreducible build hour requirement. 
 
Table 4: Build Hours per Vehicle in the US, German, French, Japanese and Korean 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industries 
 
 US Germany France Japan Korea 
1969 173 269 n/a 280 n/a 
1970 189 278 267 254 n/a 
1971 162 270 257 224 n/a 
1972 169 268 241 217 3,033 
1973 167 266 238 203 2,244 
1974 182 308 248 200 2,378 
1975 174 279 292 176 1,475 
1976 163 246 254 173 1,360 
1977 165 258 251 158 1,270 
1978 170 278 253 146 1,006 
1979 179 294 241 147 917 
1980 202 318 252 135 1,255 
1981 204 271 260 138 1,118 
1982 204 267 243 140 839 
1983 163 262 225 139 725 
1984 165 266 237 141 670 
1985 155 258 220 139 572 
1986 154 266 199 133 453 
1987 173 255 175 132 348 
1988 174 256 162 132 352 
1989 170 286 n/a 132 n/a 
Sources: Industrial Statistics Yearbook, United Nations; Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 
International Labour Office; Automotive News Market Databook, Crain Publications Inc. 
Note: Build hours per vehicle are derived by dividing annual vehicle production by sectoral 
hours (employees multiplied by hours worked). 
 
 The evidence in table 4 allows us to reinterpret Japanese success and to present the 
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Koreans in a new light. Low wages were and are the secret of success for Asian new 
entrants in the 1990s as they were for Japan in the  1970s. The Japanese never had a huge 
2:1 physical build hours advantage over the Americans which MIT imagined (Womack et 
al., 1992); the Japanese were low cost producers because in every year up to 1985 their 
major assemblers paid wages which were in dollar terms half or less than half of those paid 
in Detroit at the same time as their suppliers paid even lower wages. The Koreans represent 
a second phase of Asian low wage competition because they are pulling the same trick as 
the Japanese; get labour hours down to a competitive level and then ride to market success 
on the back of much lower wages. The point is proved by table 5 which presents some basic 
data on sectoral labour cost per vehicle calculated by multiplying motor sector build hours  
the wage rate in US dollars. Since 1980, the Koreans have had a labour cost of $1,100 - 
$1,800 in each vehicle and that is substantially lower than the advanced countries which 
(including Japan after 1985) have $1,800 or more of labour in each vehicle. The high wage 
countries, like US and Germany, have more than $3,000 of motor sector labour in each 
vehicle. 
 
 
 The question, of course, is whether vehicle manufacturing is typical of other sectors 
where the physical unit of output is more difficult to measure. The balance of technical 
argument and financial evidence suggests that vehicles are typical.  
 
Table 5: Labour Cost Per Vehicle (US Dollars) 1969-1989 
 
 US Germany France Japan Korea 
1970 1,021 778 587 330 - 
1971 1,053 945 643 358 - 
1972 1,099 1,126 627 434 819 
1973 1,152 1,490 809 568 741 
1974 1,565 2,218 918 740 999 
1975 1,392 2,037 1,139 669 797 
1976 1,597 2,165 1,422 813 979 
1977 1,980 2,786 1,682 948 1,473 
1978 2,210 3,558 2,125 1,183 1,610 
1979 2,327 4,204 2,290 1,176 1,641 
1980 2,565 4,357 2,545 999 1,719 
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1981 3,142 3,442 2,496 1,214 1,834 
1982 3,366 3,391 2,309 1,162 1,661 
1983 2,624 3,039 1,913 1,154 1,573 
1984 2,640 2,740 1,801 1,156 1,521 
1985 3,519 3,560 2,244 1,543 1,396 
1986 3,265 4,894 2,567 2,062 1,155 
1987 3,771 5,942 2,695 2,508 1,051 
1988 3,341 5,530 2,284 2,376 1,478 
1989 3,706 6,721 n/a 2,600 n/a 
Source: Automotive News Market Databook, Crain Publications Inc., Industrial Statistics 
Yearbook, United Nations, fax communication, VDA, various years. 
Note: Labour cost calculated as (wage rate + social cost)  build hours per vehicle. 
 
Cars represent the most difficult and demanding kind of repetitive manufacturing because 
the product is highly engineered and incorporates 20,000 separate parts; if Korean 
conglomerates can manage competitive build hours in cars, they will easily manage it in 
microwaves and VCRs. This technical conjecture is confirmed by financial results in 
different sectors of the Korean economy: the results in terms of cash generation are broadly 
similar in cars and electricals/electronics. 
 
 The Korean capacity to generate cash from manufacturing is truly awesome. Table 6 
presents the basic data on labour's share in motor vehicles and electrical engineering and it 
shows that right through the period 1976-88 the Koreans invert the usual 70/30 ratio; where 
competitors are lucky to realise 30 cents in each dollar of value added as cash, the Koreans 
realise the best part of 70 cents as cash. In the western economies, we have never seen 
whole sectors with this kind of performance; in the West, 30-40 per cent labour shares have 
been the prerogative of a few heroic exception firms such as Ford (Highland Park). The only 
sectoral and national precedent comes from Japan in the period when it was a new entrant; 
labour's share of value added was below 50 per cent in Japanese manufacturing as a whole 
in the 1950s and at or below 55 per cent throughout the 1960s. The explanation is relatively 
simple. The Japanese, as new entrants in the 1950s and 1960s, were, like the Koreans in the 
1970s and 1980s, selling on their home and export markets at prices which reflected the cost 
recovery requirements of their high labour cost western competitors; as their labour costs 
per unit were dramatically lower, their cash recovery was phenomenal. 
 
 The ultra cash-generative enter a virtuous circle of expansion which is funded by 
 
 
   The Crisis of Cost Recovery Page 18 
 
their surplus. During the 1980s, real manufacturing value added (MVA) or net industrial 
output has grown by around 10 per cent per annum in economies like Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore; whereas the established Western economies have MVA growth rates of only 1.5 
to 3.5 per cent. Rapid compound growth from a small base produces significant results fairly 
rapidly; the Korean vehicles industry currently produces 2 million vehicles per annum and 
its electronics industry accounts for 40 per cent of the televisions which are traded 
internationally. The factories of the new entrants are always fully loaded because in export 
markets they can sell entry level products at very attractive prices. The cash generative also 
have unusual ability to move across and up national markets; the cash from entry level 
products allow them to price in a predatory way, undertake expense investment in 
distribution and invest in an endless stream of new models and production facilities which 
take them up market. If the Japanese precedent is anything to go by, all this will be 
attributed to superior management techniques which generate increased efficiency and ailing 
Western firms will be told (for a price) that they can save themselves by adopting the 
appropriate techniques.  
 
 
Table 6: Labour's Share of Value Added in the Korean Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 
and Electrical Engineering Sectors 
 
 Motor Vehicles (384) Electrical Engineering (383) 
 Labour's share Profit's share Labour's share Profit's share 
1976 36.0 64.0 33.9 66.1 
1977 31.6 68.4 33.6 66.4 
1978 35.6 64.4 38.7 61.3 
1979 37.9 62.1 45.4 54.6 
1980 55.4 44.6 43.6 56.4 
1981 38.2 61.8 38.3 61.7 
1982 29.2 70.8 36.7 63.3 
1983 31.3 68.7 32.0 68.0 
1984 34.6 65.4 31.0 69.0 
1985 27.4 72.6 33.7 66.3 
1986 31.8 68.2 29.9 70.1 
1987 30.4 69.6 32.5 67.5 
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1988 35.5 64.5 34.4 65.6 
Source: Industrial Statistics Yearbook, United Nations; Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 
various years. 
 
 The more intellectually interesting questions concern the conditions under which 
national economies move onto and off the trajectory of high growth and ultra cash 
generation. Low wages are a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving onto the 
trajectory. On the basis of Japanese and Korean experience, three supplementary conditions 
are equally important: first, a growing domestic market which provides an unproblematic 
volume base for domestic firms; second, a political structure which mobilises corporate 
resources to prevent annexation as a dependent assembly site for foreign players; and, third, 
an economic infrastructure with diverse capabilities so that the new entrant can capture a 
substantial part of the production chain. A growth trajectory may be possible where one of 
these three conditions is not satisfied; but it is very unlikely where two or more conditions 
are absent, as in the case of India or the more benighted parts of eastern Europe. In this 
respect, industrialism is like Christian salvation; many are called but few are chosen. 
 
 Countries move off the trajectory of high growth as money and real wages rise 
through the combined effects of concessions to the workforce and currency appreciation; as 
the Renault executive cheerfully told us “wages don't stay low for long”. They do however 
stay low for long enough to relocate capacity and create major new corporate players. In the 
first phase of Asian low wage competition, between 1978 and 1991 US car production fell 
by 3.7 million and Japanese car production increased by more than 4 million. The residuary 
legatees of this expansion are the firms which managed it, like Nissan and Toyota. We 
expect Korean expansion to leave a similar legacy of production capacity and new 
household names like Hyundai, Daewoo and Samsung. As wages rise, these firms will, like 
their Japanese predecessors, lose their low labour cost advantage but that does not remove 
them from the global scene nor ease the low wage pressure on Western producers if the 
Koreans are succeeded by another generation of new entrants. In any case, the labour market 
tightening effect only operates strongly in relatively small countries. Established Western 
producers may be grateful that the Korean workforce includes only 19 million workers and 
the Malaysian workforce just 7 million; they would presumably prefer not to think about the 
Chinese workforce which numbers 583 million. The prospects of Guangdong province may 
be uncertain but it will be a little while before a tightening labour market raises Chinese 
wages. 
 
The New Disorder: Element (b) The Emergence of Major Sectors and Whole 
Advanced Economies with Chronic Problems about Cash Generation 
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 Economists, such as Paul Krugman, argue that the established industrial countries 
should not fear low wage competition from Asian new entrants or more generally from the 
Third World. Those who are not convinced by his theoretical arguments about wages, 
marginal productivity and the gains from trade (Krugman, 1994b) may yet be swayed by his 
empirical observation about bloc autarchy (Krugman, 1994a). Krugman argues that the 
competitivity debate rests on a false analogy between companies and (large) countries or 
blocs which generate most of their income by selling goods and services internally to their 
own citizens: domestically generated income accounts for around 90 per cent of EC, US and 
Japanese GNP. From an orthodox economic point of view, the effects of trade must then be 
very limited because the circular flow has few leakages and domestically generated income 
constitutes an unproblematic insulator or cushion. The main determinant of long term 
income growth must be the rate of growth of domestic productivity which is limited by 
supply side constraints; thus, Krugman argues that Europe does not have an external trade 
problem but an internal productivity problem exacerbated by labour market rigidities which 
prevent the creation of low wage jobs (Krugman, 1994a). 
 
 In its own terms, this view is less than convincing. As  Krugman's critics (Prestowitz, 
1994) have observed, a limited trade exposure to competitors with very different cost 
structures is likely to have leveraged effects on the domestic economy and may well be 
seriously destabilising. And from the rather different viewpoint of social accounting, the 
recent developments look much more ominous for two reasons. First, as we argue in this 
section, the increased external pressure from new entrants is particularly threatening for 
established industrial countries because this group of countries already has internal 
difficulties about cost recovery which reflect chronic demand side problems. Second, as we 
argue in the next section, enterprise level attempts by managers in the advanced countries to 
solve problems about cash generation are likely to resolve the narrow financial problem at 
the expense of considerable social cost as institutions and behaviour mutate pathologically. 
 
 There is of course nothing new about industrial problem sectors which run with high 
labour shares and do not generate cash. In all the advanced economies, the process of 
structural change has traditionally worked by wasting such sectors out of existence; in the 
case of some low value added manufacturing, like cheap clothing and textiles, the process of 
wasting has been associated with the transference of such activity to low labour cost areas. 
But the process of change is now likely to speed up because of three new developments on 
the cost recovery front in the advanced countries: first, all of manufacturing in some 
advanced countries has apparently chronic problems about cash generation; second, large 
parts of some important high value added sectors, such as cars and electricals, have 
problems about cash generation in most of the advanced countries; third, these trends are 
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developing against a background of worsening demand side problems about market 
cyclicality and saturation. 
 
 In terms of cash generation, the worst placed national economies are those like 
Germany and Sweden which have traditionally covered the costs of expensive social 
settlements by selling up-market product; this situation is both tragic and ironic when these 
two countries have been social ideals and role models for the centre left in other advanced 
countries. The problems of German manufacturing are particularly striking because of their 
gravity and because the Germans account for more than half of EC manufacturing output. 
Table 7 illustrates the problem by presenting data on labour's share of value added in 
German manufacturing as a whole, as well as in Germany's competitors; the position is 
broadly similar in German autos and slightly worse in the German electricals sector. In 
German manufacturing as a whole, labour's share is in the range of 77 - 80 per cent through 
the 1980s. Positive cashflow depended entirely on very high rates of capacity utilisation 
which were sustained through the 1980s but collapsed with the end of the German 
reunification boom in 1991. Other European economies, like France and Italy, which started 
the 1980s with high labour shares benefited from the upturn in the later 1980s and 
succeeded in reducing labour's share; there is no corresponding improvement in the German 
case. 
 
Table 7: Labour's Share of Value Added in Manufacturing 1979-1990 (percent) 
 
 France Germany Italy UK US Japan 
1979 77.0 77.3 73.6 65.9 71.9 65.0 
1983 78.5 79.5 69.7 64.3 71.1 66.6 
1984 77.5 78.5 67.4 61.4 69.5 65.1 
1985 77.0 77.6 64.6 58.5 70.6 67.3 
1986 75.0 78.3 63.2 60.5 69.7 70.4 
1987 72.0 79.0 62.7 57.8 69.2 66.6 
1988 68.1 76.9 61.5 56.3 68.5 63.9 
1989 68.6 76.3 67.3 61.4 n/a 63.1 
1990 67.6 76.8 66.5 62.0 n/a 64.0 
Average 73.5 77.8 66.3 60.9 70.1 65.8 
Source: Eurostat, Series 4C, National Accounts, main aggregate tables and detailed tables, 
various years. 
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 Equally ominous, the crisis of cost recovery engulfs whole sectors of core industries 
right across the advanced countries. The predicament of autos and electricals is particularly 
striking because these have been leading sectors which together employ a large percentage 
of the workforce in most advanced countries; if we add the out of sector employment 
sustained by vehicle manufacture, autos alone directly and indirectly account for between 12 
and 25 per cent of manufacturing employment. Preliminary research indicates that 
electronics and electricals are in as much of a mess as autos; Japanese firms like Hitachi and 
Toshiba have seen a 30 per cent reduction in their cash flow over the period of the 1980s. 
The problems in cars are graphically illustrated by Table 8 which presents data on cash flow 
per vehicle produced by three American and three Japanese assemblers. Of the Japanese 
assemblers, Toyota as market leader and Honda as successful minor, are steadily and 
securely cash generative: but the second largest assembler, Nissan, is chronically weak and 
needs a domestic boom, such as it enjoyed in the late 1980s, before it can generate $800 of 
cash per vehicle. To be fair, these are vertically disintegrated firms which have much of 
their cash flow in suppliers. Whether they can access this cash is, however, doubtful at least 
in the case of Nissan which was so financially embarrassed by 1993 that it was considering 
the sale of its equity stakes in its suppliers. As for the American firms, Ford (which 
downsized in the late 1970s) is securely cash generative. The two other firms of Chrysler 
and General Motors (GM) have a pattern of feast and famine which is determined by 
cyclical movements in the saturated American car market; in a good year they can generate 
$1,500 or more per vehicle and in a bad year they have to borrow short term to cover the 
costs of model replacement. So far at least, the two American firms have suffered a burden 
of increasing indebtedness because they cannot pay back all that they borrow on the 
succeeding upswing. 
 
Table 8: Company Cashflow Per Vehicle Produced ($ US) 
 
 Honda Nissan Toyota Chrysler Ford GM 
1981 987 429 361 253 424 835 
1982 720 430 374 574 697 921 
1983 830 464 543 917 901 1,424 
1984 1,025 395 558 455 1,033 1,294 
1985 1,401 508 812 1,403 1,185 1,198 
1986 1,917 604 970 1,452 1,327 1,085 
1987 1,486 735 1,126 1,527 1,744 1,204 
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1988 1,552 931 1,140 1,307 1,984 1,677 
1989 1,110 703 1,087 948 1,945 1,540 
1990 1,220 790 1,312 936 1,574 700 
1991 1,323 770 1,434 537 925 565 
Source: Company report and accounts, various years. 
Note: Cashflow is defined as value added less labour's share. 
 
 Re-normalisation of labour's share and the restoration of cash generation is all the 
more problematic because an increasing number of firms in all the advanced countries must 
now encounter the market conditions which have largely frustrated GM and Chrysler's best 
efforts. 
 
 
 
Table 9: New Car Registrations (000s) 
 EC Japan US 
1960 3,146 229 5,855 
1965 5,367 586 9,314 
1970 7,049 2,379 8,388 
1971 7,596 2,403 9,729 
1972 8,361 2,627 9,834 
1973 8,503 2,934 11,351 
1974 7,424 2,287 8,701 
1975 7,668 2,738 8,262 
1976 8,331 2,449 9,751 
1977 8,853 2,500 10,826 
1978 9,295 2,857 10,946 
1979 9,426 3,037 10,357 
1980 8,888 2,854 8,761 
1981 8,722 2,867 8,444 
1982 9,208 3,038 7,754 
1983 9,772 3,136 8,924 
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1984 9,166 3,096 10,129 
1985 9,495 3,104 10,889 
1986 9,737 3,146 11,139 
1987 11,211 3,275 10,166 
1988 11,819 3,717 10,479 
1989 12,204 4,404 9,853 
1990 12,400 5,103 9,159 
1991 11,822 4,868 8,175 
1992 12,607 4,954 8,214 
Source: Motor Vehicle Statistics of Great Britain, SMMT and Automotive News Market 
Databook, Crain Publications Inc., various years. 
 
If the Germans have a supply side problem about the expense of their social settlement, all 
the rest have a demand side problem about saturated and cyclical markets within their bloc. 
It is generally accepted that macro economic conditions have deteriorated in the past twenty 
years since the long post-war boom collapsed into the first oil crisis. The point we would 
add is that micro economic conditions in the markets for autos, electricals and electronic 
goods are increasingly bleak, as demonstrated in Table 9. 
 
 The recent history of the US car market shows the EC its future. The American car 
market is saturated with three cars for every two economically active persons; the American 
car market has not shown any sustained volume growth and the sales peak of 11.35 million 
cars in 1973 has never been surpassed; replacement demand is highly volatile and the 
market is prone to demand collapse which knocks sales volume down by 25-30 per cent in 
every downturn. As table 9 shows, the EC 12 experience over the past twenty years has 
been considerably more favourable; this is a market which has a history of volume growth 
so that each cycle has historically taken volume sales to a higher level. But, in our view, the 
vista from 1994 onwards is of flat EC demand with intermittent cyclical collapse. The 
underlying problem is market saturation at lower levels of automobility than in the US 
which is larger, richer and more car centred. The EC already has a park of 135 million cars 
and the “big four” national economies have a park of 106 million cars; this represents one 
car for every economically active person or 60 cars for every square kilometre of the EC. 
The industry's efforts to produce a durable, long life product may even reduce sales in the 
medium term; only 17 per cent of cars in the EC are over 9 years old, whereas in America 
27 per cent of the park is over 9 years old. The end result, in the present recession, is an 
increasingly desperate attempt to shift product by offering deep discounts; in early 1994, 
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fleet buyers of GM (Vauxhall) cars in the UK could expect discounts of more than 40 per 
cent on list which was hardly good for GM Europe's cash flow. 
 
Table 10: Park of Cars in Use in EC(12), 1967-91 
 Vehicles 
in use 
Cars 
in use 
Cars per 
economically 
active person 
Cars  
per square 
kilometre 
1967 53,325,963 45,952,454 0.37 20.5 
1971 70,321,989 62,414,757 0.49 27.8 
1975 86,171,341 77,007,125 0.65 34.3 
1979 103,319,112 91,445,912 0.65 40.7 
1987 131,837,917 116,004,474 0.67 52.1 
1991 153,001,809 134,790,178 0.94 60.1 
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour Office, Motor Vehicle Statistics 
of Great Britain, SMMT, various years. 
 In consumer electricals and electronics, the market problems are different but equally 
threatening to cash flow. In electronics at least there is the possibility of stimulating 
consumer demand by developing new products for the mass market. The industry has 
however found it increasingly difficult to develop new “must have” products to replace old 
products like colour televisions which are now available at next to nothing prices. The VCR 
of the mid 1980s was the industry's last winner; fewer than 40 per cent of European 
households have CD players, microwaves or video cameras because the current generation 
of new products either requires expensive software or performs supplementary functions 
which many can live without.  Table 11 illustrates the problems by considering the price, 
volume and real market value trends over the decade from 1983 to 1993 in the markets for 
ten old and new products across the four major European national markets which account 
for 65 to 75 per cent of EC sales in these product lines. The market trends for new and 
existing product lines are profoundly discouraging because the electrical and electronics 
firms have been cutting prices without realising the benefits of increased demand.  
 
Table 11: Percentage change in Market Volume, Price and Value (in 1983 prices) for 
10 Electrical Products in the Four Largest EC National Markets 
 
Product Market price 
% change 
Market volume 
% change 
Market value 
% change 
Electric cookers -55 +49 -37 
Colour televisions -47 +55 -18 
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Washing machines -27 +6 -23 
Refrigerators -35 +25 -19 
Electric toasters -37 +41 -12 
Vacuum cleaners -14 +52 +27 
Microwave ovens -72 +634 +205 
VCRs -67 +113 -30 
Video cameras -69 +1,905 +225 
Home computers -30 +78 +25 
Source: Consumer Europe, Euromonitor, various years. 
 
Price cuts are nearly universal; the unit price has been falling in old products such as colour 
televisions as well as in new products like microwaves and video cameras and in mechanical 
products such as cookers and washing machines as well as in electronic products like VCRs. 
But the impact on volume has been generally disappointing; only four relatively new 
products (microwaves, VCRs, video cameras and home computers) manage volume 
increases of more than 50 per cent and only the two newest products (micro waves and 
video cameras) manage spectacular volume increases of more than 500 per cent. Declining 
prices and weak volume increases combine arithmetically to reduce the overall value of the 
market in real 1983 prices; in six of the ten product lines market value declines and only two 
of the remaining four cases (microwaves and video cameras) show large increases in the 
value of the market. Our interpretation is that uncontrolled price cuts in saturated markets 
are not stimulating demand but undermining the conditions of cost recovery. This looks like 
the end of mass production without flex spec anywhere in sight and puts in question the 
widespread assumption that consumers are prepared to pay more for sophistication and 
variety; insofar as consumers are buying a multiplicity of new products in relatively small 
volumes they are imposing large extra development and tooling costs which are hardly good 
for cost recovery.  
 
 These European observations from two important sectors do not of course imply 
global market saturation in all sectors. But it is difficult to be optimistic about the 
development of new sectors which could replace autos and electricals; and it is more 
difficult to believe that established high labour cost countries will benefit from the opening 
of new markets for old products. New sectors might, like the US cavalry, come charging in 
to rescue the situation. The question we would ask is simply: which sectors?  All the techno 
hype about home cabling and business information highways avoids the central issue which 
is that knowledge based activities employ few workers and their market is limited by the 
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expense of hardware and software. There is of course huge potential for growth in demand 
for traditional auto and electronics products in areas like the Pacific Rim; in Guangdong 
there is scope for selling one of the basic products (car, TV, VCR etc) to every household. 
The question of course is how much of this demand will be met by European, American or 
Japanese factories whose labour costs make them high cost producers. 
 
The New World Order: Element (C) The Mutation of Institutions and Behaviour 
which Accompanies Problems about Cash Generation 
 
 The social accounting framework accommodates institutions, particularly through 
the concept of social settlement, but it does not endorse the widespread belief that 
institutional fixes can restore the competitiveness of the western economies. This belief 
comes in two variant political forms. The right wing liberal market variant argues the case 
for deregulation in general and freeing up the labour market in particular: the 
Americanization of Europe will solve the problem of Eurosclerosis, generally improve 
economic performance and specifically generate many new jobs. The centre left counters 
with the observed contrast in post-war performance between the relative failure of Britain 
and America and the relative success of Germany, Sweden and Japan. The left's variant 
argues that the Anglo American forms of capitalism are handicapped by their institutional 
structures, techniques and forms of calculation: the performance of Britain and America can 
be improved by some combination of Germanisation and Japanisation which would involve 
committed long term ownership and investment, workforce training and Japanese 
manufacturing techniques. 
 
 The policy prescriptions of the right and the centre left are manifestly different: the 
right recommends destruction of the indigenous social settlement through the economic 
programme of making the world more like the economics textbooks, whereas the centre left 
proposes imitation of the social settlements of the more successful through the politics of 
becoming somewhere else. But both programmes share a common a priori with two key 
elements: first, they both assume that the causal relation runs from institutions to 
performance; second, they both abstract from the necessary processes of adjustment and 
transformation. In this section we will question both elements of the a priori using evidence 
from Britain where the liberal market fix has been the principle of government policy and 
the centre left fix has figured prominently in opposition manifestos.  
 
 The problems of abstraction are clearest when the British government tries to defend 
its position on opting out of the European Community Social Chapter provisions which 
other member governments accept. In a radio interview (BBC, September 22, 1994) the 
British employment minister, Michael Portillo argued that if Britain refused provisions such 
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as paternity leave and works councils, employment costs would be lower and Britain would 
then be competitive against new Asian producers of manufactures. This is a classic example 
of old order thinking which refuses to consider the new realities of disorder and the 
magnitude of the required adjustments. A small increase or decrease in British social 
charges might be relevant to intra-European competition but it will certainly not meet the 
challenge of Korea. That challenge requires a very large adjustment involving wage cuts of 
more than 50 per cent plus an increase in hours worked of around 50 per cent combined 
with a substantial cut in fringe benefits and social provision. 
 
 It is a challenge which some liberal market enthusists claim could be met by 
allowing the wages of all workers employed in world manufacturing to converge on an 
equilibrium level of around 7.50$ per hour when consumers would benefit from the cheaper 
manufactures that then became available.  This fantasy abstracts from all the real problems 
of the adjustment path in a country with a European style social settlement. The main 
burden of adjustment would fall arbitrarily on the minority of the workforce employed in the 
tradeable (manufacturing) goods sector and, as living costs would not fall pari passu, there 
would, under European conditions, be a vast increase in dependence via various forms of 
subvention such as rent rebates. In any case, none of the advanced economies are likely to 
go down this path. With or without trade unions, with or without mass unemployment, 
labour markets are segmented in ways which limit downwards wage adjustment whose 
knock on effects on the overall demand for labour are in any case uncertain. Wages will not 
flex, or not enough to meet the Korean challenge, so workers will be displaced as value 
added is transferred elsewhere. 
 
Table 12: Composition of Employment in the UK (million) 
 
 Shift 1 Shift 2 Shift 3 
 Manufac-
turing 
Services Male Female Full- 
Time 
Part- 
Time 
1977 7.2 12.7 11.1 8.8 16.4 3.5 
1993 4.2 15.2 9.5 9.9 13.6 5.8 
Loss or 
Gain 
-3.0 +2.5 -1.6 +1.1 -2.8 +2.3 
 Employee wages are 25 
per cent less in services 
than in manufacturing 
Female full time wages 
are only 80 per cent of 
male full time wages 
82 per cent of the loss 
in full time jobs is 
offset by the increase 
in part time jobs 
Source: Employment Gazette, Department of Employment, various years. 
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 In the new disorder of free trade with absolute wage disparities of more than 2:1, the 
liberal market solutions propose policies which are likely to spread disemployment and 
deteriorating pay and conditions without securing the objective of competitivity. The 
policies of Portillo and the Conservative government will put more beggars on the street and 
more homeless underneath the arches when they are applied in a country which has already 
seen a dramatic deterioration in the balance between high and low wage blue collar 
employment. Table 12 summarises the main structural developments of the past 15 years: 
since 1977 in a small country with a workforce of around 25 million, the number of 
manufacturing, full time and male jobs has declined by between 1.6 and 3 million while 
service, part time and women's jobs have increased by between 1.1 and 2.5 million. This 
amounts to a deterioration in the composition of employment because, in the UK, service 
jobs on average pay wages which are 75 per cent of those in manufacturing; and female pay 
is on average 80 per cent of male pay. This kind of deterioration in the composition of 
employment creates structural economic problems because wages and salaries sustain 
private consumption which accounts for most of the demand in the economy. It also creates 
political and social welfare problems about increasing dependence and exclusion from 
citizenship; under European conditions, flexible labour markets means pricing people back 
into jobs and a life of dependence. 
 
Table 13: Cashflow Per Manufacturing Employee in the US ($) 
 
 France Germany Italy UK US Japan 
1979 5,474 6,235 4,981 5,857 8,268 n/a 
1983 4,734 4,922 6,097 7,102 9,378 7,259 
1985 8,968 8,961 13,573 15,463 22,555 13,189 
1987 11,149 6,713 15,025 13,233 14,459 13,350 
1989 13,467 9,895 14,422 13,055 14,150 18,082 
Source: Eurostat, Series 4C; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, various years. 
 
 If the right's policies are pernicious, the centre left's are implausible because they 
make the orthodox optimist assumption about the one way causal relation from (better) 
institutions leading to (superior) performance. They do not consider the pessimist possibility 
that the relation also runs the other way from (inferior) performance to (worse) institutions.   
 
 The evidence on these issues is, of course, ambiguous. Table 13 summarises the 
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evidence on cash flow per employee in the manufacturing sectors of different advanced 
economies and, at first sight, illustrates the superiority of cash flow generation of British and 
American institutions. In the early 1980s UK manufacturing generates as much or more 
cash per employee than most of the mainland European competitors like Italy and France; 
while American manufacturing turns in a super performance with up to twice as much cash 
per employee than some of its competitors which at times included Japan.  It is true that the 
Anglo American stock exchange requires cash for distribution and the corporate sector 
obliges by generating the necessary cash surplus; in a country like Britain half of profit and 
a quarter of cash flow are currently distributed in the form of dividends. We would argue 
however that this financial evidence should be read in the context of productive and market 
performance. In the British case, our interpretation is that Table 13 shows how it is usually 
possible to find cash by productive and market retreat. In a decade of case studies on British 
firms we have documented a structural process of hollowing out and a behavioural shift to 
financial engineering or the shuffling of assets which serves no productive purpose: firms 
like British GEC pioneered defensive deindustrialization through market retreat from the 
1970s onwards (Williams et al. 1983) while conglomerates like Hanson pioneered deal 
driven offensive running for cash in the 1980s (Adcroft et al. 1991). 
 
 The case of the Anglo-American conglomerate Hanson is particularly interesting 
because this low tech manufacturing and commodity producer has through dealing achieved 
financial ratios which could not be achieved by operating in these sectors. In the early 1980s 
Hanson had an ordinary labour share of value added around 70 per cent but, from 1987 
onwards, labour's share has been maintained in a range of 43-53 per cent. Lords Hanson and 
White, who run the conglomerate, had the prescience to recognise the coming crisis well 
before the rest of us; their defensive operating response was to choose sheltered 
manufacturing activities and commodities, avoid businesses where the Japanese were active, 
concentrate on low tech activities with modest investment cash requirements, and 
incentivise their managers to strip labour out of operations. Unfortunately, Lord Hanson's 
prescience is not matched by his responsibility in the increasingly desperate pursuit of cash. 
 The 50 per cent labour share depended on dealing in companies and selling on parts of what 
Hanson bought as SCM and Imperial Tobacco. Dealing hit the wall in 1990 as the economy 
turned down; since then Lord Hanson has undermined his balance sheet by buying 
businesses (like Peabody and Cavenham) where the earnings came cheap because they are 
tied to provisions which go straight into Hanson's balance sheet. 
 
 Hanson is a creation of the British stock exchange; German firms are not under such 
strong external financial pressure to distribute.  But, if internal cash generation fails, 
something must be done to safeguard the productive and market future. From this point of 
view, the drying up of German cash flow over the 1980s, like the deterioration in the 
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Japanese position after 1991, is worrying because the financially embarrassed are always 
tempted into irresponsible short termism. This can be illustrated from the current 
restructuring in the European car industry which we have analyzed in two recent public 
interest reports on BMW's purchase of Rover (Williams et al., 1994a) and the abortive 
Volvo merger with Renault (Williams et al., 1993).  BMW was opportunistically seeking 
productive and market advantage: the purchase of Rover for £900 million was a cheap way 
of entering 4 wheel drive and small cars. Volvo's senior management was seeking financial 
advantage because the merger with Renault was a way of exiting the auto business and 
getting further into pharmaceuticals, matches and margarine.  We doubt whether Swedish 
workers can again rely on Swedish investors to block this kind of Hansonism: if truth is the 
first casualty of war, then social responsibility is the first casualty of cash shortage. 
 
 If (or when) the late capitalist world ends, it will not be with one big macro 
economic bang but with many small micro economic whimpers. The micro shocks caused 
by managers' attempts to save themselves and meet external requirements are likely to 
damage the institutions of countries like Germany and Japan which represent the economic 
achievement of the post-1945 period; the new disorder threatens both the European forms of 
co-determination incorporating strong unions and the Japanese form of job security for 
some. More generally, a cumulating burden of unwaged or low waged dependence would 
inflict secondary damage on the redistributive welfare institutions of Western Europe which 
are the enduring social legacy of the post war settlements. With 10 million at or near social 
security levels, the British seem to have already reached the limits of their political will to 
redistribute through higher taxes. If problems about cash generation undermine institutions 
as well as change behaviour, the difference of German and Japanese capitalism may not be 
sustainable and the laggard irresponsible Anglo-American forms of capitalism may show 
Germany and Japan their future. In that case British and American centrism becomes 
entirely irrelevant; how can we solve our problems by becoming something which is ceasing 
to exist? 
 
Policy Implications 
 
 The economic shift from modernity to post modernity  can be characterised in many 
ways through different kinds of work on the fault lines and slippages around the transition. 
Within the frameworks of economics or social accounting, the shift can be characterised as 
an unblocking of limits on the circulation of, and competition between, productive inputs 
and outputs. In his book The Work of Nations Robert Reich (1992) has championed this 
kind of problem definition: the post modern problem is the new mobility of productive 
capital which can only be attracted to America by investment in training the American 
workforce. In our view, Reich mis-specifies the problem and the appropriate policy 
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response. 
 
 Reich exaggerates the mobility of productive capital which is in any case neither a 
necessary or sufficient condition of the present crisis. Manufacturing investment accounted 
for 20 per cent or less of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow in the 1980s. The 
manufacturing investment flow of this decade was mainly between high wage blocks where 
it served to create capacity in high income markets: in 1991, the cumulative stock of 
American FDI in Europe was ten times larger than the stock in low wage Asia (excluding 
Japan). The Japanese transplants of the 1980s in Europe and America of the 1980s 
represented nothing more than a further instalment of old style investment in market access 
which will no doubt continue as the Koreans and Taiwanese get in on this act. The new 
disorder is distinctive because it contains the possibility of large scale movement in search 
of low production costs: all the advanced countries have most of their capacity in high cost 
social settlements and could improve cost recovery by shifting to low cost social settlements 
in a new kind of movement on which there are few restraints and for which there is little 
precedent. 
 
 The condition of the new mobility of capital is the old, long established mobility of 
goods: low wage factories require free access to high income markets. The 1940s architects 
of the post-war order envisaged free trade in goods which was progressively and imperfectly 
realised over the next forty years. Although, the 1980s deregulators added free movement of 
capital nobody envisaged or allowed the pre-1914 style of free movement of population in 
pursuit of economic opportunity. The unspoken assumption was that the free movement of 
goods but not of peoples would make the world safe for the advanced countries. And, for a 
while, these rules did prevent the undermining of social settlements in the advanced 
countries by immigrants at the factory gate.  But these rules did not deliver permanent 
security because, when and if the exchange of manufactures ceases to take the form of 
exchange between advanced countries, the import and export of goods itself becomes a form 
of social exchange and competition which can undermine advanced country settlements.  
 
 In this eventuality, the appropriate policy response is not supply side tinkering but 
new blocks on the exchange of goods. Benjamin Franklin's aphorism “no nation was ever 
ruined by trade” provides the current principle of trade policy which is instituted in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) type multilateralism. Our policy alternative is 
more discriminating. Free trade between the advanced countries is appropriate because 
competition between different countries with broadly similar social settlements and limited 
differences in wages and hours is necessary and beneficial. But free trade between different 
social settlements with large disparities in wages and hours is inappropriate because this 
kind of competition is economically unfair and socially destructive for the advanced 
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countries. To make the same point more positively, access to advanced country markets by 
low wage new entrants should be made conditional upon changes in their social settlements; 
market access should, for example, be made conditional upon a reduction in excessive 
hours. As we have argued in the British case (Williams et al., 1994d), these external policies 
for tradeable goods need to be complemented by internal policies for sheltered sectors 
which reestablish the internal social floor and limit the spread of sweated and casualised 
employment. 
 
 It will of course be argued that we are defending privilege by proposing policies 
which will block the economic progress of the Third World. In reply we would suggest that, 
whilst this raises a serious issue, the choices need not be so stark. Thus, for example the 
development of Guangdong province and coastal China in this generation, or of India in the 
next, does not require export led growth which lays waste manufacturing in the advanced 
countries: the development of China and India could and should be mainly sustained by 
internal linkages within large and growing markets. It should be possible to constitute an 
international economy where such countries have a large part of the regional and bloc 
development gain without irresponsibly hazarding the institutions of the already developed 
world. We should always remember that there is no automatic mechanism of institutional 
compensation which generates progressive institutions in Asia as fast as they can be 
destroyed in Europe or North America: economic development in Guangdong province may 
not generate political democracy leave alone trade unionism and countervailing power. 
Practically, the issue is not whether we block Third World development but whether we 
countenance the recreation of the Third World in the First. 
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